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Abstract
The aim o f this paper is to extend the critique which informal logic employs 
against fallacious reasoning to a critique o f ideological argumentation.
Two main problems are addressed: the first problem concerns criteria for 
the identification o f 'ideological' fallacies, and the second concerns the 
place which ‘ideological’ fallacies are to be accorded in a ‘taxonomy' o f 
fallacies. I address the first problem by developing a critical concept o f 
ideology: argumentative ideological discourse serves to justify relations o f 
domination and exploitation and is potentially misleading. Two illustrative 
examples o f 'ideological' fallacy are presented: an ‘appeal to public 
interest' and an ‘appeal to the will o f God’. In addressing the second 
problem, I argue that these ‘ideological' fallacies may best be classified as 
typical variations o f main classes o f fallacies which are traditionally 
distinguished (inconsistent premises and relevance).
1. In trod u ction
This paper takes for granted that there are fallacies2, that they occur not infre­
quently in argumentative discourse and that they have a legitimate place in the 
curriculum of courses in critical thinking or informal logic. It goes on to argue 
that it makes logical sense to identify, and pedagogical sense to make students 
acquainted with fallacy variations which can properly be called ‘ideological’ fal­
lacies.
This essay is a reworked version of a paper presented at the 12th Annual International 
Conference on Critical Thinking at Sonoma State University, California, USA, August 9- 
12, 1992. South African referees have made useful suggestions for the improvement of the 
essay.
By ‘fallacy’ I mean an argument which is incorrect in a typical manner and is also 
deceptive in appearance or in the manner o f reasoning in such a way that it can be 
mistaken for a good argument (cf Van Veuren, 1991:83-84).
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The identification of ‘ideological’ fallacies implies that the critique which infor­
mal logic employs against fallacious reasoning is extended to a critique of ideolo­
gical argumentation. This procedure poses two problems which need to be ad­
dressed. The first problem concerns the criteria for the identification of ‘ideo­
logical’ fallacies and calls for a clarification of the concept of ideology. The 
second problem concerns the place which ‘ideological’ fallacies are to be accor­
ded in a ‘taxonomy’ of fallacies. In what follows I shall discuss and clarify the 
meaning of the concept of ideology for the concerns of this paper. Following this 
theoretical discussion I shall present instances o f ‘ideological’ fallacies and argue 
that the teaching of ‘ideological’ fallacies contributes in a special way to the 
critical orientation which courses in critical thinking want to foster in students.
2. Id eo lo g y  and fa llacy
The program formulated above to extend the critique which logic employs against 
fallacious reasoning to a critique of argumentation which serves an ideological 
purpose demands a negative or critical concept of ideology. However, such a 
concept of ideology is confronted in contemporary literature on the subject by a 
dominantly positive or neutral concept of ideology. In this section I shall argue 
that a negative or critical concept of ideology does have some legitimacy.
Ideological argumentation has not (to any noticeable extent) been made an object 
o f study in informal logic. It has, however, received some attention in studies on 
rhetoric. It seems that in this context authors generally favour the neutral concept 
of ideology.3 The neutral concept of ideology can be illuminated by the metaphor 
of ‘social cement’: an ideology is a system of ideas (or alternatively a systema­
tized set of values) which establishes social relations and fosters social coherence 
and integration. The neutral concept of ideology is also elaborated in the Marxist 
tradition from Lenin through Lukács and Gramsci to Althusser. In this tradition 
the ‘social cement’ of ideology unifies members of a class on the level of class 
consciousness. In Lenin, for example, socialist consciousness is a fusion of 
proletarian class consciousness, ideology and science (Larrain, 1983:68). In the 
non-Marxist tradition too, influential contemporary authors (like Clifford Geertz
For example: Balthrop, 1984:343; McGee & Martin, 1983:50. Chaim Pcrelman (1979: 
143, 145) writes: "To exercise power it is essential that it be rccognizcd as legitimate and 
that it enjoys an authority that brings about the consent of those who arc subject to it. This 
is the necessary role of ideologies. [...] Denying all value to ideologies is to return political 
life to an armed struggle for power from which the most influential military leader will 
undoubtably emerge successful.” This conception of ideology leads to the consequence 
that it "is from another ideology, another ideal of man and society that the prevailing 
ideolog' can be criticized" (Perelman, 1979:143), which seems to exclude a logical critique 
of ideological reasoning
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and Martin Seliger) seem to prefer some version of the neutral or positive concept 
of ideology.
The predominance of the neutral concept of ideology in literature on the subject 
should, however, not be allowed to obscure the fact that there also exists a 
tradition of the negative use of the concept.4 This negative, critical concept of 
ideology goes back to Napoleon’s abusive use of the term ideologues for 
members of Destutt de Tracy’s Institut National and his derogatory reference to 
the term ideology as a kind of ‘shadowy metaphysics’ (cf. Thompson, 1990:31). 
De Tracy’s Elements d'Idéologie (1803-1815) is an exercise in foundationalism: 
the project of his ‘science of ideas’ as a ‘first science’ is to give a foundation for 
all knowledge and the rational management of social relations and social change. 
This ‘science of ideas’ was conceived only to counteract the effects of the 
Jacobin Terror during the French Revolution and not to abrogate the project of 
the Enlightenment as such. It was in effect a re-affirmation of this project and of 
the declaration of universal human rights. Thus, although Napoleon at first 
supported De Tracy’s project, he later became a vehement critic of ‘ideology’ 
and the ‘ideologues’ because their project was incompatible with his authoritarian 
rule as First Consul (1799-1810). Napoleon’s use of the term ideology was a first 
step in the development of a negative meaning of the term: as De Tracy used it, it 
referred in a neutral way to the science o f  ideas; as Napoleon used it, it referred 
also to the ideas themselves as a system of ideas which are erroneous and 
divorced from the realities of political practice (cf. Thompson, 1990:32).
2.1 M arx’s negative concept o f  ideology
Through his exile in Paris (1844-1845) Marx was familiar with De Tracy’s work 
and Napoleon’s attack on it; he and Engels employed the concept in a negative 
sense in The German Ideology, which was written immediately after the end of 
Marx’s exile (1845-46).
In the initial stages of the development of its meaning, the negative import of the 
concept of ideology was based on a rather simplistic contrast between abstract 
ideas and concrete political practice. Marx, however, underpins the negative 
content of the concept with a philosophical theory of some sophistication. In the 
present context two features of Marx’s theory of ideology need to be highlighted: 
the illusionary and misleading nature of these ideas and the functional nature of 
these ideas.
4 J.B Thompson (1990:29-73) has argued for this point in some detail
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Marx’s critical conception of ideology links up with the first stage in the de­
velopment of the negative meaning of the concept, in which ‘abstract’ ideas are 
contrasted with concrete practical activity. However, in Marx the disjunction 
between ‘theory’ and ‘praxis’ is not a polemical move, but it is something which 
has a historical origin in the division of material and mental labour. According to 
Marx this division enables consciousness to emancipate itself from existing 
practice and "flatter itse lf... th a t ... it is really conceiving something without con­
ceiving something r e a l ... and ... proceed to the formation of ‘pure’ theory, theo­
logy, philosophy, ethics, etc." (Marx & Engels, 1938:20). This body of ideas is 
‘ideological’ in the sense that it produces the illusion that it constitutes a separate, 
real and independent sphere which is completely divorced from the field of hu­
man praxis, and that it causally influences the concrete historical situation in 
which people make history by producing and reproducing their material existence. 
It is crucial for understanding Marx’s concept of ideology to note that the 
autonomy and efficacy of ideas which are divorced from praxis are illusionary. 
Such ideas are but "reflexes and echos” (Marx & Engels, 1938:14). Nevertheless 
they are "the ideal expression of the dominant material relationship grasped as 
ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, 
therefore the ideas of its dominance" (Marx & Engels, 1938:39). In Marx’s fa­
mous phrase the "ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas" 
which serve to entrench, perpetuate and rationalize its power (Marx & Engels, 
1938:39).
It seems to me that if one wants to take the tradition of the negative concept of 
ideology seriously in the present, two elements of Marx’s theory o f ideology need 
to be salvaged, i.e. his insistence on the misleading and illusionary character of 
ideology, and the function ideological discourse has in sustaining relations of 
domination, inequality and exploitation.
It is not possible to give a detailed critique of all the relevant theses of Marx’s 
philosophy within the confines of this paper; therefore I shall mention only two 
which are crucial in the present context. In my view these theses have become 
untenable and are therefore not incorporated in the negative concept of ideology 
which is proposed here.
2.1.1 Relations of domination and exploitation
In Marx relations of domination and exploitation in modem Western society are 
understood exclusively in terms of the relation between owners o f the means of 
production and the working class, whose members are compelled to sell their 
labour on the market. In present-day Western societies, however, the lines of 
demarcation which Marx employed to differentiate between classes in capitalist 
society have become fuzzy, with the result that relations of domination and
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exploitation which are not based on class have gained in definition and promi­
nence, e.g. those based on gender, ethnicity and economic hegemony (‘North- 
South’ divide).
2.1.2 Ideology as ‘ideas’ and ideas being essentially passive
In Marx’s theory of ideology ideas or theories which are divorced from praxis 
are ‘ideological’. The emphasis on ‘ideas’ (or ‘systems of ideas’) harks back to 
the original meaning of the term ideology in De Tracy’s "Elements of Ideology". 
This emphasis on ‘ideas’ is characteristic of the age of rationalism and ‘philo- 
sophy-as-epistemology’. Moreover, in The German Ideology Marx views ideolo­
gical ideas as "echos" and "reflections" of the "real forces and relations of pro­
duction". These metaphors suggest that ideology is essentially passive -  a point 
which Marx wishes to make against Hegel. Marx’s metaphor of an ‘ideological 
superstructure’ has the same import: it is based on naval terminology which 
refers to the superstructure of a ship, which is based on the hull of the ship and is 
bound to follow its movement. Both of these claims of Marx -  i.e. that ideology 
is constituted by ‘ideas’ and that these ideas are essentially passive -  have been 
firmly set aside in recent literature on ideology which connects ideology with 
language5
2.2 Ideology as discourse
The connection of ideology with language has some important implications for 
the study of ideology: it turns it away from the study of ‘ideas’ towards a study 
of language. In the context of language ‘ideas’ cease to be purely mental 
phenomena: rather they are utterances, expressions -  i.e. words which are 
spoken or inscribed and circulate in a social world in which people communicate 
with each other, interact with each other, produce history and reproduce the 
society in which they live. Language itself is, to paraphrase Thompson (1990: 
58), a constitutive factor of social reality and is actively involved in the creation 
o f relations between individuals and groups. Therefore, in the context of lan­
guage, ideology does not exist in ‘passive’ ideas but in the active ways in which 
language serves to establish and to sustain relations of domination. Domination 
obtains
... w hen established relations o f  pow er are ‘system atically asym m etrical’, 
that is, when particular agents or groups o f  agents are endow ed w ith power 
in a durable w ay w hich excludes, and to some significant degree rem ains in-
J.B. Thompson (1984) reviews the (mainly French) literature on the relationship between 
ideology and language.
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accessible to, other agents or groups o f  agents, irrespective o f  the basis 
upon w hich such exclusion is carried out (Thom pson, 1990:59).
Language can of course be studied on various levels (e.g. the levels of phonology, 
morphology, syntax, etc.). The level on which language functions in everyday 
communication and interaction between people is primarily the level of discourse, 
in other words the level of linguistic units that exceed the limits of single 
sentences. Instances of discourse are conversations, speeches, texts, etc. (cf. 
Thompson, 1984:8). Language on the level of discourse is capable of sustaining 
the functional nature of ideology which I have already pointed out: it is on this 
level that a complex series of strategies by which language is mobilized for the 
maintenance of relations of domination come into operation. This means that a 
study of ideology is not so much a study of the content o f ‘ideas’ but of the va­
rious ways in which discursive language serves to establish and sustain relations 
of domination in concrete situations (cf. Thompson, 1984:41). If an analysis of 
ideology is conceived in this way, it must perforce be contextualized. The ‘ideo­
logicalness’ of instances of discourse is not an ‘inherent’ feature of these instan­
ces, but rather a feature which is constituted by the function of discourse in spe­
cific social situations. These concrete social situations require close conside­
ration, and where necessary social-historical analysis in order to amass and pre­
sent evidence of power relations which are "systematically asymmetrical" (cf. 
Thompson, 1990:23, 283-4).
2.3 Ideological functions o f  discourse
Thompson (1990:60) presents a list which suggests five different ideological 
functions which discourse may have. I want to draw on his suggestions in the 
following reconstruction, but I shall not follow it in detail because of some 
measure of confusion it seems to contain concerning the argumentative structure 
discourse may exhibit in some instances. While Thompson accords a subordinate 
position to argumentative structure in his list (he ties it rather exclusively to 
rationalization as a "strategy of symbolic construction"), I want to propose that 
argumentative structure be accorded a more important place in the analysis of 
discourse. Analysis of a variety of texts in which language acquires an ideolo­
gical function, suggests a division of discourse into at least two main categories, 
i.e. that of argumentative discourse and that of suggestive discourse.6 While the 
first type of discourse is characterized by reasoning, the second type is charac-
This categorization does not intend to be exhaustive: there are various other types of 
discourse (eg narrative, descriptive, etc.) and various strategics other than those 
mentioned in Table 1. Furthermore, one type of discourse is seldom found without the 
admixture of other types. Tabic 1 represents the barest minimum of distinctions which arc 
necessary for my argument in this paper.
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terized by rhetorical procedures. Various powerful argumentative and rhetorical 
strategies which can have an ideological function can be linked to these types of 
discourse, as the table below shows.
T ab le  1







The distinction between argumentative and suggestive types of discourse seems 
to me to be of importance for the program which I propose, i.e. to extend the 
logical critique of fallacious reasoning to discourse which serves to sustain 
relations of domination. This program presupposes that such discourse has at 
least in some instances an argumentative structure. It seems to me that discourse 
which serves to entrench relations of domination proceeds by way of argumen­
tation especially in those cases where justification or legitimacy is sought by 
providing grounds or reasons for the implementation or existence of social 
policies or measures which facilitate domination and exploitation. Argumentative 
strategies need to be clearly distinguished from strategies which operate through 
suggestion in order to dissimulate relations of domination and exploitation. I 
shall first discuss some of these mainly rhetorical strategies and then return to the 
strategies of argumentation.
2.3.1 Rhetorical strategies
As Thompson (1990:62) points out, relations of domination may be established 
and sustained by being concealed, denied or obscured, or by being represented in 
a way which deflects attention from or glosses over existing relations or 
processes. The following examples are highlighted:
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* The strategy o f displacem ent through which the positive connotation o f a 
term is transferred into a context where it has a dissimulative function; for 
instance, the law which proh ib ited  black South Africans from attending 
‘white’ universities was called The Extension o f  U niversity Education Act.
* Euphemization  is another strategy which facilitates the dissimulation of 
relations o f domination and exploitation. Actions, institutions, policies, etc. 
are described or redescribed in terms which elicit a positive evaluation. 
South African apartheid has furnished numerous examples o f this practice: 
the name o f the Department o f Bantu Education was changed to the 
Department of Education and Training; the Department o f Bantu Affairs 
was changed to the Department o f Plural Relations; the policy o f  apartheid 
came to be called ‘separate development’.
* Fragmentation  is a strategy which has been used in South Africa to great 
effect. It consists in fragmenting individuals or groups that are mounting an 
effective challenge to the dominant group. In the 80s it was often claimed 
by supporters o f the policy o f apartheid that ‘South Africa is a country of 
racial and tribal minorities’. This was said at a time in which black 
opposition to apartheid was more unified than ever, and was meant to 
deflect attention from this fact.
2.3.2 Strategies of argumentation
I shall now discuss two argum ents which satisfy the criteria specified above for 
fallacious reasoning with an ideological function, i.e. they are both poten tia lly  
m isleading  and they have in fact se rved  to establish  an d  ju s tify  relations o f  
domination an d  exploitation?
2.3.2.1 Universalization: appeal to the public interest
Domination and exploitation have no inherent sanction and must therefore derive 
it from elsewhere, for example from religious beliefs or from the criterion o f 
public interest.8
An appeal to the public interest in argumentative discourse may have the function 
o f establishing and justifying relations o f domination and exploitation. Appeals to 
the public interest occur frequently in discussions and debates concerning public
More examples o f arguments which may be construed as ‘ideological’ fallacies can be 
found in Van Veuren (1991:114-115).
See in this regard Flathman (1973).
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policy, in which cases it serves as a criterion by which public policy may be 
measured. If  a policy is judged to be in the ‘public interest’ (or in the ‘interest of 
the country’) it is implied that the costs and benefits o f the policy in principle 
accrue indiscriminately to all members o f the community. Such is the conven­
tional connotation o f the term.
In order to ascertain whether a specific instance o f argumentative justification of 
a policy or law by an appeal to the public interest has an ideological function and 
contains fallacious reasoning the argument (such as the following one) must be 
subjected to close analysis.
The connection between white poverty and the presence of coloureds and 
natives in the country must be openly faced. It is impossible to make 
proposals to enhance the economic prosperity of the white poor without 
affecting the other groups in one way or another. The dilemma in which we 
find ourselves is that in the interest of the country more prosperity must be 
gained for the white poor and that, also in the interest of the country, it may 
not be gained in a way which will make the economic side of the coloured 
and native problems insoluble. This much must be honestly admitted. 
Therefore, when discrimination in favour of the white worker can be found 
in some of the economic proposals, then it must be realized that not only 
has what is advantageous for our problem group -  the white poor -  been 
considered, but what is advantageous for the country! For example, where 
a certain preferential treatment of the white poor causes a problem -  but a 
soluble problem for the non-white, there has been no hesitation in choosing 
it ... This is a policy statement if you wish, of giving sympathetic consi­
deration to the rights and interests of the whites and non-whites, and then 
resolutely choosing what serves the interest of the community as a whole, 
even if it has the superficial appearance of preferential treatment (Ver- 
woerd, 1972:55).
This convoluted argument gives a justification o f ‘job  reservation’ by an appeal to 
the public interest. The argumentation o f Verwoerd’s speech can be reconstruc­
ted according to the following pattern:
* (Premise 1) Policy/administrative measure P is in the interests o f group
G (formulated explicitly or implicitly).
* (Premise 2) (But) policy/administrative measure P is (also) in the pu­
blic/national interest.
* (Conclusion) Therefore implementation/existence o f policy/administra­
tive measure P is justified.
Arguments according to this pattern are o f course not necessarily fallacious 
arguments -  it is conceivable that the interests o f group G coincides completely
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with the public/national interest. However, if policy/administrative measure P is 
such that it in fact serves only the economic and/or political interests o f group G, 
then these particu lar  interests have been universalized  in Premise 2 (i.e. re­
p resen ted  as serving the interests o f the community or the nation at large), in such 
a way that we get an argument with inconsistent premises. Verwoerd’s argument 
states in Premise 1: Job reservation is in the interest o f  the p o o r  white w orker 
and Premise 2 states: Job reservation is in the in terest o f  the country/ com ­
munity as a  whole. In his novel 1984 George Orwell calls the ability to think in­
consistently without logical discomfort "doublethink". In 1984 the facade o f the 
Ministry o f Truth bears the following inscription:
W ar is P eace
F re ed o m  is S lavery
Ig n o ran c e  is S treng th
The government in 1984  encourages such ‘double thinking’ in order to condition 
its subjects to accept indefensible government policies.
The confusing complexity o f Verwoerd’s argument tends to hide the 
inconsistency in its premises. However, if  an argument’s premises are inconsis­
tent, one o f the statements must necessarily be false, and the conjunction o f  the 
two inconsistent statements is also logically false. Such premises necessarily 
undermine the argument in which they are used. It should be noted that the 
social-historical context o f Verwoerd’s argument is implicated in the reconstruc­
tion o f the argument which is given above. In the face o f a great deal o f evidence 
(which is common knowledge) it is taken for granted that the apartheid policy o f 
job  reservation in fact served only the economic and political power interests o f 
the poor white worker, and (by implication) that the statement made in Premise 2 
is false. However, common knowledge can be questioned and it could turn out 
that a detailed social-historical analysis needs to be given to provide better 
support for the reconstruction o f the argument presented above. In the final ana­
lysis no conclusive p r o o f  can be given that the argument is incorrect, but a 
convincing case may still be made that the argument is incorrect and has contri­
buted to establishing and sustaining relations o f domination and exploitation.
2.3.2.2 Deification: appeal to the will of God
Relations o f social, political and economic domination in South African society 
mainly coincide with the primary division between ‘w hite’ and ‘non-white’. 
Divisions o f a society according to skin colour in order to establish asymmetrical 
relations o f power in the society differ from other criteria o f  division in that they 
are based on an empirical criterion. Whereas social divisions on the basis o f 
class, religion or language may have blurred edges and may be disguised in
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various ways, division according to skin colour is unambiguous and very obvious. 
The social, economic and political subordination of one group to the other on the 
basis o f skin colour cannot easily be dissimulated, but needs to be justified 
directly.
One o f the ways this is done in argumentative discourse is by an appeal to the 
will o f God. Relations o f domination are justified as unalterable ‘ordinances of 
creation’ or as an expression of G od’s will which cannot be questioned and must 
therefore be accepted. This strategy of deification  is employed in the following 
argument.
T h e  co n g ress [ ‘C o n g ress o f  the  P e o p le ’ a t B lo em fo n te in , S ep tem b er 1944] 
a lso  sta te d  its  c o n v ic tio n  th a t th is  p o licy  [o f  rac ia l ap a rth e id ]  ‘is b ased  on 
H o ly  S c rip tu re  w h ich  teach es  us th a t n o t u n ifo rm ity  b u t m u ltip lic ity  o f  n a ­
tio n s is the  w ill o f  G o d  and  th a t he  fu lfils  h is d es ig n  th ro u g h  th e  m u ltip lic ity  
o f  n a tio n s, races , lan g u ag es an d  c u ltu re s ’ . .. w h en  G o d  w ills  a d iv isio n , then  
h e  w ills  it in an  ab so lu te  sense  (G ro en e w ald , 1947:42 , 49).
The structure o f this argument can be represented in the following way:
* (Premise 1) A asserts that policy/administrative measure P is the will
o f God/in accordance with the will o f God.
* (Conclusion 1/ Policy/administrative measure P is the will o f 
Premise 2) God/in accordance with the will o f God.
* (Conclusion 2) The implementation/existence o f policy/administrative
measure P is justified.
Assertions about the will o f God usually make an appeal to authoritative inter­
pretations o f the Bible. In some cases reference to A (Premise 1) is omitted, sup­
pressed, or an adpopu lu m  appeal is substituted for it. In cases where an appeal 
is explicitly made to an authoritative interpretation of the Bible the argument is 
fallacious if the authoritative wisdom is prejudiced by special interests and is 
therefore ipso fa c to  controversial, or controversial for other reasons.9 This is the 
case in the example above, where the authority to which an appeal is made is the 
‘Congress o f the [white Afrikaner] People’. This appeal does not give any sup­
port to the claim made in conclusion 1, or in the (implied) conclusion 2 o f the ar­
gument, i.e. that the implementation o f the policy of apartheid is justified. Again 
it should be noted that the social-historical context o f the argument is implicated
For example: the authoritative pronouncem ent is not consistent with what other 
experts in the relevant domain say, or is inconsistent with known evidence in the 
relevant domain (W alton, 1989).
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in the construal o f the argument as a fallacious appeal to authority (a d  verecun- 
diam). The special interest (economic and political power conferred on white 
Afrikaner people by the policy o f racial apartheid) which qualifies the authority as 
‘prejudicial’ in this case, is taken to be common knowledge. However, this con­
strual o f the argument and the contribution it made to establishing and sustaining 
relations of domination in South Africa could be better supported and clarified by 
a social-historical analysis.
3. ‘Taxonomy’
I would like to turn now to the second problem mentioned in the Introduction, i.e. 
the place which ‘ideological’ fallacies are to be accorded in a ‘taxonomy’ of 
fallacies. The claim that there are ‘ideological’ fallacies obviously does not com­
mit one to hold that all ideological argum ents are fa llaciou s. Besides, the state­
ment in italics is untenable because it is easy to think o f an ideological argument 
(i.e. one which justifies domination and exploitation) which is not fallacious (al­
though it might be incidentally  devious or wrong-headed (or both) because it has 
debatable premises and makes untenable assumptions). By way o f example:
* (Premise 1) If it is desirable to maintain Western norms and standards
in South Africa then the great majority o f  the black popu­
lation should be re-located in the traditional tribal areas or 
‘homelands’.
* (Premise 2) It is desirable to maintain Western norms and standards in
South Africa.
(Conclusion) Therefore the great majority o f the black population 
should be re-located in the traditional areas or ‘home­
lands’.
What I wish to argue is that som e  cases o f ideological reasoning are not inci­
dentally  devious or wrong-headed (or both), but exhibit a typ ica l procedure of 
reasoning which, although it is incorrect, can have the appearance  o f correct 
reasoning and therefore can be (and in fact often is) mistakenly taken for correct 
reasoning by the person proposing the argument and/or the recipients o f the 
argument. For example: under certain conditions ideological reasoning universa­
lizes particular interests in such a way (an appeal to the public interest) that the 
argument acquires inconsistent premises. Because o f the manner in which the ar­
gument proceeds, or because o f psychological factors, or lack o f  knowledge (or 
all o f these factors), the incorrectness o f the reasoning is not apparent, and the ar­
gument can fool some people some o f the time.
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Although the ‘ideological’ fallacies which I have discussed in this section do 
exhibit typical characteristics in that they (respectively) make an appeal to ‘the 
public interest’ and to ‘the will of G od’ it does not seem warranted to place them 
in a class o f  their own next to the main classes o f fallacies which are usually 
distinguished (fallacies of relevance, unacceptable premises, etc.), because the 
incorrect reasoning in them can be subsumed under existing main classes of 
fallacies (inconsistent premises under unacceptable premises and a d  verecundiam  
under fallacies o f  relevance). Therefore I want to suggest that these ‘ideological’ 
fallacies be taken as typical variations o f the inconsistent premises and the a d  
verecundiam  fallacies.
4. Critical thinking in the ‘strong sense’
Definitions o f critical thinking, a concept which originated in the USA in the 40s 
(Paul, 1992:1) are, to use a cliché, a dime a dozen. Because o f the large number 
o f definitions in circulation I shall simplify and highlight only the principal 
connotation which the term critical has acquired in combination with the term 
thinking.
There seems to be some consensus that ‘critical thinking’ can be defined in terms 
o f a "skill dimension" and a "dispositional dimension" (Facione, 1991:8). The 
qualification ‘critical’ seems to be connected more directly with the ‘skill dimen­
sion’: skills in (for example) interpretation, analysis and inference have asso­
ciated criteria by which their execution can be meaningfully evaluated. ‘Critical’ 
thinking would thus seem to be thinking which is explicitly aware o f the criteria 
to which it should conform. In my view this connotation o f ‘critical’ as a quali­
fication o f ‘thinking’ is unproblematic. However, the reservation should be made 
that it can lead (and in fact has led) to a limited conception o f the task o f critical 
thinking. Critical thinking which sets itself only the limited task o f teaching 
students certain skills and the criteria which apply to them, tends to narrow the 
context in which these skills are exercised to the lecture room, and to select 
illustrative examples which have been divorced from the social context in which 
they function (or functioned). There is a tendency to present such examples to 
students as isolated logical puzzles, the solutions giving them some intellectual 
satisfaction but rarely confront them with the social-historical world in which they 
are active participants and which in its turn acts upon them.
Richard Paul (1982:3) has described critical thinking which is informed by this 
limited perspective on its own goals as "critical thinking in the weak sense" (in 
contrast to "critical thinking in the strong sense"). The former is the "traditional 
conception" o f critical thinking. Paul does not scrap the ‘traditional conception’ 
but views it as "a limited set o f moves within a more complex set of actual or
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possible moves reflecting a variety o f logically significant engagements in the 
world" (Paul, 1982:3).
With a view to "logically significant engagements in the world", the main purpose 
o f my essay has been to develop a theoretical framework which may enable 
critical thinking to extend the scope o f its critique to discourse which sometimes 
serves to establish, justify and dissimulate relations o f  domination and exploita­
tion in the social w orld.10 Teaching critical thinking ‘in the strong sense’ in this 
context would amount to building bridges between the academic study o f  argu­
ment and the social world, for example by pointing out to students that argumen­
tative discourse often intersects with relations o f power and domination in the 
social world, and that this discourse can be subjected to a logical critique. Such a 
critique o f ideological reasoning can be a means o f self-enlightenment about 
one’s own vested interests and the ways in which one is moved by them to accept 
claims which are not supported by correct reasoning.
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